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Abstract
How are new forms of industrial organization accommodated into a country‘s
legal frameworks, and what effect does this have on the ability of firms to
innovate? Variations in the broad institutional organization of the German and
US political economies result in different processes of contract law
modernization in the two countries, with important implications for innovation
trajectories. The German institutional infrastructure encourages firms to
develop cooperative „diversified quality production“ (DQP) inter-firm strategies.
This is promoted through highly regulative contract laws and the existence of
strong trade associations that firms engage to create standardized industry
frameworks. These contracting arrangements allow the diffusion of
standardized governance structures showing firms how to create rules needed
to manage complex new forms of organization.  While strongly supporting DQP
strategies and discouraging opportunistic product market strategies, German
patterns of contract law regulation place important constraints against more
innovative product market strategies. In the United States legal resources are
decentralized across firms, trade associations have few law-making
competencies, and courts do not regulate the distribution of risks across firms.
Contractual frameworks are developed on a firm-by-firm basis and slowly
accommodated within the legal system through the generation of court
precedent. This system encourages radical innovation in the law, an important
prerequisite for innovative product market strategies more generally.  However,
the paper shows that a necessary trade-off of legal innovation in the US is that
courts cannot implement German-style contract law regulation to constrain
opportunism, while the decentralization of legal resource inhibits the creation of
standardized contractual frameworks needed for DQP strategies. Through an
extensive game theory analysis of bargaining between courts and large firms,
the paper explains why these equilibria are maintained, despite strong
incentives in the German case for some large firms to deviate.
Zusammenfassung
Wie sind neue Formen industrieller Organisation an die rechtliche Verfaßtheit
eines Landes angepaßt und welche Folgen hat dies für die Innovationsfähigkeit
von Unternehmen ? Generelle Unterschiede in der institutionellen Organisation
der jeweiligen politischen Ökonomie in Deutschland und in den USA führen zu
unterschiedlichen Formen der Modernisierung des Vertragsrechts in beiden
Ländern. Dies hat wichtige Auswirkungen auf den Typus der Innovations-
Entwicklung.
Die spezifische Ausprägung des Institutionengefüges in Deutschland
begünstigt vor allem eine kooperativ angelegte „diversifizierte
Qualitätsproduktion (DQP)“, an der mehrere Unternehmen beteiligt sind. Dies
wird gestützt durch ein hochreguliertes Vertragsrecht und starke
Gewerkschaften; die Verbände nutzen dies, um für alle Unternehmen geltende
Regelungen zu entwickeln. Diese Art, vertragliche Vereinbarungen zu
entwickeln und zu gestalten, führt zu einer allmählichen Verbreitung
allgemeingültiger Governance-Strukturen, durch die die Unternehmen erfahren,
wie sie Regelungen entwickeln können, um neue, komplexe Formen der
Zusammenarbeit zu managen. Das in Deutschland verbreitete Vertragsrecht
erweist sich als vorteilhaft für DQP-Strategien und als hinderlich für kurzfristig
orientierte Produktmarktstrategien; es führt aber auch zu schwerwiegenden
Einschränkungen bei der Entwicklung innovationsorientierter
Produktmarktstrategien.
In den USA ist die juristische Kompetenz, gerade auch, was die Klärung
juristischer Grundsatzfragen angeht, auf viele Unternehmen verteilt.
Gewerkschaften haben nur geringe Möglichkeiten, die Gesetzgebung zu
beeinflussen und die Gerichte regulieren nicht, wie die Risiken aus der
Zusammenarbeit von Unternehmen aufgeteilt werden. Die rechtlichen
„Rahmungen“ vertraglicher Vereinbarungen werden fallweise in Unternehmen
entwickelt; gerichtliche Musterentscheidungen passen sie dann Schritt für
Schritt an die bestehenden gesetzlichen Regeln an. Dies begünstigt radikalere
Innovationen in der Gesetzgebung; sie wiederum sind generell eine wichtige
Voraussetzung für innovative Produktmarktstrategien. In dem Papier wird
gezeigt, daß der schnellen Innovationskraft des amerikanischen
Gesetzgebungssystems als Nachteil gegenübersteht, daß die Gerichte keine
Regulierungen einführen können, die dem in Deutschland entwickelten
Vertragsrecht vergleichbar und durch das sehr schnelle, quasi opportunistische
Marktorientierungen einzuschränken wären. Die Dezentralisierung juristischer
Kompetenz in den USA verhindert die Schaffung eines allgemein gültigen
rechtlichen Rahmens, der wiederum Voraussetzung für eine diversifizierte
Qualitätsproduktion ist.
Durch eine ausführliche spieltheoretische Analyse von
Aushandlungsprozessen zwischen Großunternehmen und Gerichten wird
erklärt, warum sich die jeweils spezifischen Gleichgewichtssituationen erhalten,
auch wenn es in Deutschland für einige Großunternehmen starke Anreize gibt,
davon abzuweichen.
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11. Introduction
In recent years the analytical focus of the comparative political economy field has
shifted.  A new literature focusing on the role of employers, companies, unions, and
other “social actors” has begun to supplant earlier, state-centered frameworks (Wood,
1997; Mares, 1996; Soskice, forthcoming; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992).   In a more
complex, decentralized economy traditional industrial policies are less effective
(Kitschelt, 1991).  Instead of orchestrating the economy, the state is now viewed as one
actor among many.  Special emphasis has been placed on business coordinated
market economies, in which neocorporatist legal frameworks sanctioned by the state
allow designated social actors to negotiate the terms of industrial adjustment directly.
Within Europe, Germany quickly emerged as a star performer in this field, as virtually
every domain within the economy contains “para-public institutions” (Katzenstein, 1989)
in which social actors negotiate the terms of change (Thelen, 1991).  Furthermore,
thanks to widespread legal regulation under the guise of the social market economy,
traditionally weak market participants (workers, unions, small firms) are delegated
important bargaining rights within these institutions (Streeck, 1984).   Because the
costs of adjustment cannot easily be imposed on the weak, the German economy is
often seen to engender long-term “high-road” solutions that are seldom possible in the
more liberal, market-oriented US and UK economies (Turner, 1991, 1997).
The German response to the rapid rise of the Japanese model of production
during the 1980s consolidated this consensus.  While the US and UK at first seemed
unable to mount a coherent response to the introduction of new production concepts,
German institutions facilitated the creation of firm-level competencies needed to
eagerly embrace them.  The new forms of flexible production made good use of highly-
skilled German labor and cooperative, long-term relationships between firms (see
Streeck, 1989).  The system of long-term finance and extensive diffusion of new
technologies to small firms through trade associations, the apprenticeship program, and
other programs allowed a rapid re-tooling of the industrial infrastructure.  The result was
the widespread adaptation in industry of a “diversified quality production” (DQP)
product market strategy (Streeck, 1992).  German firms excelled in a variety of high
value-added export oriented industries, such as specialty chemicals, high-end
automobiles, and a range of niche-market machine tool and industrial machinery
markets.  The success of this strategy can be seen most clearly in Germany's export
performance during the 1970s and 1980s.  During this period exports as a percentage
of GDP increased from 21 to 32 percent, the balance of trade was negative in only one
year (1980) and increased from an annual average of 2.4% in the 1970s to 3.2% in the
1980s (figures excerpted from Casper and Vitols, 1997: 1-2; see also Carlin and
Soskice, 1997).
2During the 1990s, however, growing pessimism surrounds the German model.
Despite the initial economic boom provided by unification, the German economy has
struggled throughout the 1990s.  Economic growth has been low.  During the sharp
1992/3 recession real GDP fell over 2 percent below the previous year's level.  The
recovery since then has been disappointing, with annual growth of about 2 percent in
1995 and 1996 after 3 percent growth in 1994.  Business profitability reached a post-
war low of 1.9 percent of sales before taxes in 1993 and has rose only to 2.4 in 1994
and 2.5 in 1995 (Deutsche Bundesbank figures, cited in Casper and Vitols, 1997: 2).
While the prolonged economic problems of the mid-1990s have many causes
(Carlin and Soskice, 1997), much of the analysis, both scholarly and political, has
focused on the continued viability of the German production model.  Faced with
American competition in high-technology industries and East Asian success in
upgrading the quality of mass-produced consumer goods, many critics now see little
room for traditional German product market strategies emphasizing incremental
innovation in established technologies.  In particular, institutions and policies promoting
innovation have come under attack.  Though adequate at diffusing existing innovations
(Lütz, 1993), the German system seems unsuccessful in fostering more radical
innovation (Soskice, 1997).  This has lead to a chronic weakness in high-technology
industries such as information technology and biotechnology.  While German
companies have long been leaders in established science based industries such as
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and mechanical engineering, German companies may be
losing their competitive edge now that the pace of technological change has quickened.
Critics argue that "imitate and improve" innovation strategies are no longer adequate
given shorter product life cycles (Jürgens, 1994). Wolfgang Streeck, long a leading
proponent of the German model, now sees the declining relative importance of high
value-added niche markets in traditional industries as leading to an "exhaustion" of the
German model (Streeck, 1996).
While the majority of scholarly attention has focused on the industrial relations
system (see Thelen, forthcoming), the problems facing German industry today is
mirrored in other institutional domains.  Through comparison with the United States, the
chapter examines the development of German legal regulation in the area of inter-firm
relationships and the influence of these laws on the competitive strategies of firms.
How are new forms of industrial organization accommodated into a country’s
institutional frameworks, and what effect does this have on the ability of firms to
innovate?
Institutional architectures and patterns of public legal regulation are virtually
identical in areas of corporate organization as they are in industrial relations.  The
German institutional infrastructure encourages companies to develop cooperative inter-
firm strategies that directly parallel the DQP product market strategy as conceptualized
in work organization, training, and other areas of industrial relations. Companies
3engage a network of trade associations to create standardized contractual structures,
which I call “industry frameworks.”  These contracting arrangements allow the diffusion
of standardized governance structures showing firms how to create rules needed to
manage complex new forms of organization introduced by innovative firms.  Industry
frameworks also contain a number of important club goods that can dramatically lower
the cost of contracting.  Courts use industry frameworks as the basis with which to
impose strong legal regulation punishing companies attempting to choose short-term,
price-based strategies focused on delegating important legal and market risks to
weaker contractual partners. Through bracketing distributive conflicts over the gains
from cooperation, these regulations promote long-term supplier relations.
As a liberal market economy, the United States lacks the institutional
arrangements needed to support DQP-style strategies in the area of inter-firm
relationships.  In the United States new contractual frameworks are developed on a
firm-by-firm basis and slowly accommodated within the legal system through the
generation of court precedent.  Whereas German legal resources in Germany are
concentrated within para-public institutions and a few large firms, in the US most firms
have access to sophisticated legal talent.  This, combined with the lack of legal
regulation, encourages radical innovation in the area of law.  The drawback is that it
also necessarily condones the use of opportunistic contractual structures.  No legal
restrictions inhibit powerful firms from delegating legal and market risks to their weaker
partners.
Facing US and other international competitors employing different product
market strategies, many large German firms resist choosing DQP strategies and would
prefer not to develop or use industry frameworks.  Strong legal regulation of the terms
and structure of contracts prevents the use of opportunistic strategies that delegate
risks to weaker parties or innovative strategies that require the ability to create
customized legal structures. How, then, is the German system of contracting sustained
in the face of pressures via international competition for at least some firms to pursue
alternative strategies?   Because companies must engage nation-specific legal rules to
manage complex inter-firm relationships, the form and regulatory content of these rules
strongly influences the relative costs of pursuing different product market strategies.
Through increasing the costs of choosing opportunistic strategies, courts can increase
the relative advantage for companies of creating industry frameworks and competing
with DQP product market strategies.  German public policy does not intentionally
punish innovation.  However, legal regulation necessarily discourage companies
attempting to develop innovative new contractual structures.  This is the dilemma for
German legal regulation: the same strategies fostering DQP and punishing
opportunism also stifle innovation.
To examine these issues, the chapter must begin with a somewhat technical
analysis of contract law regulation (section 2).  Emerging institutions theories within the
4law and economics literature identify the key problems facing courts, but cannot provide
a sufficient comparative analysis.  The different legal solutions adopted in the US and
Germany can only be understood through locating legal institutions within the broader
political economy.   Through examining institutional networks between groups of
companies and between companies and legal actors, it is explained why the structure
of the German political economy creates a “coordination capacity” firms may use to
create industry frameworks.  Courts in Germany can then use these frameworks to
impose very strong legal regulation (section 3).   This is followed by a strategic analysis
of bargaining between large firms, small firms, and legal actors over the content in the
two laws within the varying US and German institutional structures (section 4).  By
combining institutional and strategic logics, we can understand why different equilibria
have emerged and examine potential sources of instability within the two systems.
These issues are addressed in the conclusion (section 5).
2. Contract law regulation in the US and Germany
German and US contract laws have developed diametrically different approaches to
regulating inter-firm relationships. US contract law is constructed around classical
principles.  It assumes that all parties are sophisticated agents; through the
enforcement of formal written agreements, courts protect their freedom to contract
(Macneil, 1978). In the vast majority of cases, US courts take a conservative view of the
contract by enforcing only the written provisions of the original contract.  They usually
do this even if contingencies not anticipated in the contract favor one party in ways that
were probably not taken into account when the contract was designed.   In adjudicating
most breach of contract disputes between firms, US courts usually insist on the
fulfillment of even flawed written contracts. (Schwartz, 1992).  Though tort law creates
important external liability risks, parties may contract them out as they see fit (Priest,
1985).  This means that neither the final assembler nor supplier has preexisting legal
entitlements protecting them from a variety of potential liability problems created by
“just-in-time” logistical systems, collaborative product development projects, and other
risky practices caused by modern supplier relationships (see Casper, 1997).
By contrast, the orientation of major portions of German contract law is far more
regulatory in nature.  In the standardized contracts that, we will see, dominate major
portions of the economy, German law strictly regulates the distribution of legal
entitlements between firms, prohibits large companies from delegating unspecified risks
caused by contractual incompleteness to small companies, and limits the legal
categories companies can adopt when designing governance structures.   When
adjudicating disputes, German courts have long used the norm of “good faith,” Article
242 of the German Civil Code (BGB), as primary instrument to adjust contracts along
fairness principles (Dawson1983; Goldberg 1985).  However, even more striking is
5widespread use by German courts of the Law Regulating Standardized Contracts
(known in Germany as the AGB Gesetz).  This 1976 law unified a large body of legal
precedent applying Ar. 242 BGB to standardized contracts (Ulmer, 1984).  The wide
usage of standardized contracts, combined with the very wide scope the AGB-Gesetz
gives courts to police contracts, has made the law the center of recent contract law
developments in Germany.
The AGB-Gesetz allows courts to void or adjust any contract in which
unspecified risks are delegated to the receiver of the contract (Ulmer, 1984, Martinek,
1991).   The law severely limits the ability of large firms to design contracts granting
control rights over incomplete contracting risks to themselves.  Furthermore, the AGB-
Gesetz prohibits the inclusion of clauses in standardized contracts that change the
distribution of legal entitlements set out in the in either the Civil Code (BGB) or
Commercial Code (HGB).  Particularly in distributing liability for a range defects
between suppliers and final assemblers, this law severely constrains the ability of final
assemblers to delegate important liability risks to suppliers
In the United States, courts have attempted to impose regulatory contract laws,
but failed (see Casper, 1997, Ch. 6).  Why can German courts implement regulatory
contract laws while US courts cannot?  Legal scholars in the United States have linked
the institutional organization of judicial processes with the ability of courts to implement
different types of laws. Recent studies examining how US courts adjudicate cases
involving complex, long-term contracts reveal that information asymmetries are the key
problem thwarting more regulative strategies.  US courts refrain from adjusting
contracts over which they have incomplete information in order to protect their core role
in society in the area of dispute resolution.   Courts must apply laws in such a way as to
protect judicial process.  Decisions must be based on a consistent application of laws.
Violation of judicial process norms prevents courts from creating a consistent body of
precedent.   Precedent serves as the “shadow of the law” (Mnookin and Kornhauser,
1979), structuring private dispute resolution among private actors. This is one of the
most important functions of private law systems that courts must protect.  Courts
cannot always efficiently enforce all contracting laws.  If courts do not have the
information necessary to apply laws consistently, judicial process norms will be broken.
In a series of articles, Alan Schwartz has examined how the organization of
courts and other law making institutions influence the content and implementation of
US contract law (Schwartz, 1992). Key to all studies of long-term incomplete contracts
is the idea that companies must create a series of norms and rules to deal with
contingencies that are difficult to plan for in the written contract.  Schwartz examines a
number of reasons why contracts are typically incomplete (see also Hart, 1995).
Simplifying a complex argument, this reduces down to two broad categories (Schwartz
1992: 278-281).  First, contracts are often incomplete because the gain from having
various contingencies planned for in the contract outweighs the transaction cost of
6contracting those contingencies out.  Second, contracts are sometimes incomplete
because the information needed to complete the contract is distributed asymmetrically
across the parties and judicial system.  For example, only the producer of a good
usually knows its cost function.   In other cases, information, such as private norms
used to settle some long-term contracting problems or the responsibility for decisions
made informally, is known to the parties but not verifiable to courts when a dispute
arises.
Following an analysis of judicial processes, Schwartz argues that US courts
sometimes take an activist view of adjusting the first class of cases, but almost always
adopt a passive view towards cases plagued by incomplete information.   The reason
the first class of contracts can be completed by courts is that the information needed to
complete them is observable to the court.   Courts often adjust contracts through
granting relief when extraordinary events such as natural disaster or government
intervention make contracts difficult to fulfill.  In cases of physical inability information
concerning the difficulty is verifiable to courts, making it possible to adjust the contract
(Schwartz 1992: 293).  However, courts usually do so only if explicit control rights over
common classes of incomplete contracting contingencies are not delegated within the
contract (Schwartz 1992: 293-294).   When control rights covering the contingency do
exist, courts almost always take a passive view, even if clauses granting discretion to
one firm are vague or only partly apply to the disputed conditions.
In most cases involving asymmetric information, courts have no capacity to
uncover and verify the facts needed to resolve the dispute; the information needed to
correctly complete contracts is not verifiable to courts.  US courts rarely take an activist
role in such cases.   For example, because production costs are generally known only
to the company, courts rarely allow relief when a company cites unanticipated
increases in production costs as a reason for breaking the contract (see Schwartz, 291-
305 for examples).  An additional problem is the inability of courts to verify the content
of private norms.  For example, because companies often work closely together to
develop goods or maintain quality control systems used for JIT delivery, objective
evidence assigning liability for damages is often difficult to produce.  Minor problems
are easily solved by the parties themselves through invoking private norms, often
based on technical rules or indices developed by the parties.  However, when major
problems occur, such as serial errors during production or defective designs that cause
product recalls, courts cannot rely on private norms because they will be disputed
between the parties.  Instead, they usually rely on broad control rights set out in the
contract or assign liability on the company that can objectively be shown to be most
culpable (such as, for example, the company that conducted product testing or was
responsible for quality control).
While this analysis is not sufficient to explain the variance across US and
German contract laws, it identifies important technical problems undermining effective
7implementation of regulatory contract laws in the United States.  How can German
courts overcome information problems in incomplete contracts that have stymied
regulatory attempts by American courts?  To answer this question, we must analyze a
different philosophy of regulating contracts - a philosophy that involves regulating both
the distribution of risks and the forms of governance structures companies may adopt.
Furthermore, to understand how this system can persist, we must widen our analysis,
examining how legal institutions are embedded within the broader organization of the
political economy.
3. The intersection between legal analysis and comparative political
economy
 
While the court system is more centralized in Germany, with most precedent deriving
from the High Court (BGH), the organization of judicial processes for private law in
Germany is not fundamentally different than in the United States (see Langenfeld,
1991).  German courts do not have substantially different information gathering or
technical competencies than US courts.  How, then, can German courts effectively
develop and apply laws that cannot be successfully implemented within the US judicial
system?
An important reason complex contracting structures are difficult for US courts to
decipher (why information problems exist) is because the governance structures
companies use to manage their relationships vary widely.  Legal scholars tend to view
this problem as universal, presumably driven by the micro-organization of business
relationships.  However, these business relationships are in part derived from product
market strategies that are formed by companies to take advantage of a broader
framework of institutional incentives and constraints within the political economy.
The institutional structure of the US political economy creates incentives for
companies to choose a product market strategy based on competing on the basis of
creating innovative governance structures.  US corporate law has few restraints on not
just the distribution of legal responsibilities, but also legal categories companies
develop to manage inter-firm relationships.  Firms have wide latitude in customizing
their own governance structures.  A few basic legal concepts can be combined in a
myriad of ways to create new structures.  If the needed legal concepts do not exist,
companies can often successfully create new ones.  New contracting structures are
then incorporated into law through the precedent system.
The resulting forms of industrial organization used by US companies differ
tremendously across the economy.   Because subtle or major differences in legal
categories may exist on a case by case basis, it is difficult for US courts to gain an
8understanding of how particular governance structures are typically used to manage
various technical contingencies.  Such knowledge could inform courts how particular
control structures for incomplete contracting actually function.  Have bargaining
imbalances between the parties influenced how control rights are organized?  Are the
circumstances causing the dispute common for the form of governance structure used?
If so, courts could develop a more subtle understanding of the adequacy of the private
rules or technical standards used.  Because of the extreme customization of
governance structures in the US, it is very difficult for courts to develop such
knowledge. The passive reliance on even partially defined control rights exemplifies this
difficulty.
One reason why German law can be more regulatory is that most contracts
German courts adjudicate are standardized, conforming to a limited set of governance
structures with well-known technical and legal properties that courts can understand
and thus effectively regulate.   Limiting the ability of firms to create a variety of
governance structures makes legal regulation much easier for German courts.
Complicated inter-firm practices are similar across companies.  Courts can invest
energy in understanding the consequences of these practices in terms of the
distribution of legal and market risks across firms and create laws and precedent
regulating them.  This is often impossible in the United States because companies have
more freedom to customize contracts.  Practices differ substantially from case to case.
German private law is divided into two broad legal categories: association and
exchange.  These categories quickly translate into two basic forms of industrial
organization in Germany: firm or contract (see Hueck, 1991).   In the supplier
relationship area, contract law then assumes that a very strict, hands-off relationship
exists between fully autonomous companies, and then regulates important aspects of
the technical division of labor between these companies in order to police the
distribution of risks between companies.  The German Commercial Code (HGB) in
essence contains a late 19th century version of the technical and legal division of labor
between companies in a supplier contract relationship.  In more modern times German
courts have used the AGB-Gesetz and other legal instruments deriving from the BGB to
impose a similar, but more technically advanced, legal division of labor within the
contracting structures used by companies.
The German economy has quite obviously progressed past a 19th century model
of capitalism.  German law supports governance structures suiting the product market
strategies of not all, but most large companies in the decentralized economy of the
1980s and 1990s.   While courts and other legal actors have played an important role in
modernizing German contract law, it is large companies that have dominated the
process.   Compared to the immense freedom of action companies enjoy in the
American legal environment, large German companies exist in a legal straightjacket.
Yet, despite this, German companies have a tremendous collective law-making role.
9They collectively create new contracting structures, then, in a prolonged legal exchange
with courts, federal agencies, and sometimes the legislature, see their creations
molded into forms that comply with the broader system of legal restraints.  I refer to
these structures as industry frameworks.  They consist of interdependent legal and
technical rules that are used to manage complex inter-firm relationships.  Industry
frameworks differ from governance structures only in that they are standardized
structures commonly used by firms throughout industry and in that they are also often
used as the basis by which courts develop strong legal regulations.
How does the institutional organization of the German political economy facilitate
the modernization of German law?  It is here that coordinating institutions become
important. Within the strict principles regulating the division of risk between companies,
the German legal system grants German companies a collective law making capability
within trade associations and other institutions that does not exist in the United States.
This allows German companies to collectively develop and use industry frameworks
regulating important parts of both the legal and technical division of labor between
companies.   Courts have policy instruments helping them to understand these industry
frameworks in detail, strongly regulate their content, and then use the result as
precedent applied more generally.
In terms of facilitating the coordination of business activity, the German
associational governance system can be broken into three distinct areas:
a) Capacities of individual social actors.  In Germany social actors such as
unions, employer federations, and, of most concern here, trade associations, have
competencies in a variety of technical and legal areas that typically do not exist in the
US.  Trade associations in both countries engage in marketing and some types of
research for companies, such as gathering industry sales data (see Scheiberg and
Hollingsworth, 1990).  German trade associations possess additional capabilities, such
as the ability to create technical standards, help diffuse new technologies, or in some
cases run common technology projects sponsored by the state (Lütz, 1993; Herrigel,
1993).  In addition, they have strong law making capabilities, such as the ability to
create legal frameworks governing trading relationships within or across industries and
competency in adjudicating disputes between members.  Each of these added
competencies requires expertise about the industry, and thus intricate knowledge about
company technologies, organizational structures, and product market strategies.  This
knowledge only develops through extensive engagement of trade associations by
companies.
In Germany most specialized legal talent in the area of complex contracting law
is concentrated in a small number of trade associations and a number of very large
companies.  Lawyers from these companies usually participate in working groups within
trade associations to create new industry frameworks. The technical and legal
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resources of German trade associations provide the resources needed to create
sophisticated legal frameworks that large companies often adopt.  However, the critical
competency I want to stress is that trade associations can develop industry frameworks
combining legal and technical rules.  The capacity to provide comprehensive
governance structures increases the attractiveness of industry frameworks, particularly
to companies without the resources to develop them themselves.  Furthermore, when
companies use industry frameworks, both the legal and technical arrangements they
adopt becomes transparent to third party observers.  Through examining the
standardized practices generated by industry frameworks, courts can effectively
regulate their provisions.
b) Horizontal coordination: This refers to the ability of a trade association or other
representative body to coordinate its activities with other social actors.  In Germany
horizontal coordination occurs at two levels.  First, individual trade associations (or
other social actors, such as unions) join a broader group of associations in the same
sector of the economy and create a peak association.  For example, individual trade
associations in the industrial sector of the economy belong to the BDI (Bundesverband
der deutsche Industrie).  Peak associations have resources allowing individual
associations to share information and coordinate their activities.  The legal and
technical staffs of the BDI often work with individual associations to insure that their
industry frameworks are portable across the industry.
At the second level, peak associations coordinate their activities with other peak
associations.   Of particular importance here is the practice of peak associations
bargaining with each other to make their individual legal frameworks compatible
through using common terms, legal concepts, and rules distributing risks.  As a result,
modern commercial codes in Germany have an interlocking quality not seen in the
United States. The possibility to create interlocking laws is important because it results
in yet more standardization of contractual practice, again simplifying the judicial
regulation of contracts.  Furthermore, interlocking legal frameworks create substantial
collective goods for companies and are thus a major reason why large companies
participate in projects to create industry frameworks.
 
c) Para-public links between industry and the state (vertical coordination): While
in the US trade associations or other societal actors routine lobby legislative and
administrative officials over prospective regulation, their status is no different than any
other interest group (see Streeck and Schmitter, 1985).   In Germany there exist
numerous formal and informal linkages between social actors and the state
(Katzenstein, 1989).  Particularly in labor law, unions and employers association are
explicitly recognized within law and encouraged to create private agreements, which
are then legitimized by the state (Keller, 1991).  Though the policy process is not so
explicit within corporate law areas, it is similar.  The primary linkage between trade
associations and the state is through the Bundeskartellamt (Cartel Office), which has
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the official task of evaluating and then legalizing industry frameworks to ensure that
they do not violate Germany’s strict postwar cartel laws.  In addition to examining the
impact of all industry frameworks on market structure, the Cartel Office also must
assure that frameworks are voluntary in nature.  However, in the context of these
official inquiries, the Cartel Office has set up a much broader, informal review.  Legal
experts at other trade associations, private law firms, and university law departments
are asked to scrutinize the broader legal status of the proposed agreement, in particular
to see if would violate the AGB-Gesetz and other contract laws.
This review process has two important implications.  First, it internalizes contract
law considerations that could be brought up in eventual court reviews from an early
stage.  This ensures that AGB-Gesetz and other related regulations on contracts are of
primary consideration when constructing industry frameworks.  This has the further
effect that trade associations representing one particular class of companies, such as
final assemblers, cannot easily legalize industry frameworks that would violate contract
laws and then use the legitimacy of the agreement combined with bargaining power to
impose it on companies in another sector.  Second, when companies use industry
frameworks, they will be highly confident that they are legally permissible.  When
introducing new technical practices that impinge upon existing legal rules, the risk of
using industry frameworks (or private contracts explicitly modeled after them) is less
than private arrangements.
By comparison, the US institutional environment is different in each of these
three respects.  Trade associations and other social actors are weak, and particularly in
corporate law areas, do not have strong law-making capacities.  There exist
tremendous legal resources in the US, but these are decentralized throughout the
private economy.  Except in some legislative lobbying domains, trade associations do
not horizontally coordinate their activities.  Finally, trade associations, unions, and other
collective actors do not have privileged access to the government or legal system.
They must engage the political and legal systems through formal channels that any
other interest group can use.
Differences in the distribution of law-making institutions and resources across
the US and Germany clarify why the two contracting systems can differ.  However, it
would be mistaken to simply “read off” legal outcomes from these differences in law-
making capacities.  It is also necessary to examine the range of circumstances in which
it is in the interest of the actors involved to choose strategies that will lead to these
outcomes.  In both countries institutional structures can be used to effectively
modernize legal frameworks, but only if they are engaged by companies and legal
actors who are interested in doing so.   This is something that cannot be taken for
granted in either case.  The next two sections examine more carefully the implicit
strategic bargaining between large firms and courts in Germany and the United States.
12
4. Courts, large companies, and legal modernization
National institutional frameworks influence the governance costs of embarking on
particular product market strategies. My argument differs from the “embededness”
approach often found in sociological studies (Grannoveter, 1985).  In its simplest form,
this position holds that company organizational structures are shaped directly by the
orientation of national institutional frameworks.  Rather, I assume that company
management, faced with international competition, can survey the spectrum of possible
organizational arrangements prevalent within their industry, and attempt to shape a
coherent strategy.  National institutional frameworks play a strong role through
influencing the relative cost of building the organizational competencies needed to
pursue each strategy.
The orientation of national institutional frameworks is dependent on the actions
of large companies and courts. Large companies decide whether to engage the
associational governance system to create industry frameworks.  Courts chose the
form of legal regulation to impose on the new organizational forms.  Should courts
attempt to regulate the distribution of risks entailed by new practices, or leave it up to
the firms involved?  The cumulative strategies chosen by large firms and courts create
the framework conditions faced by firms within the country.
To examine the process of strategic bargaining between courts and large firms,
this section first examines three generic types of product market strategy companies
might adopt to compete on international markets.  I then examine the logic of strategic
bargaining over legal modernization in Germany and the United States.  Each case
begins by examining the how different constellation of national institutional frameworks
advantage each product market strategy, in terms of the likely governance costs
incurred.  This analysis helps identify the rank ordering of institutional framework
preferences for each product market strategy.  Finally, we can uses these preferences,
together with an analysis of court preferences, to examine the logic of strategic
bargaining over legal modernization.  The outcome of this bargaining produces the
actual institutional framework conditions in the country.
4.1 Product market strategy possibilities
Innovation-based product market strategies
Innovative companies attempt to create new forms of “best practice” within an
industry.  Best practice can be defined through advances in product technology itself or
through advances in the technical organization of the production process.  While
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product advances often result from radical innovation within the company, inter-firm
links are increasingly used to promote innovation. Within the automobile and most other
complex manufacturing industries, the increased technological complexity of different
components within the final product has created an incentive for final assemblers to
decentralize operations by allowing suppliers to design important subassemblies.   In
the area of inter-firm relationships, product advances are often achieved through highly
collaborative design relationships (See Sabel, 1993; Ulrich, 1995). Advances in
simultaneous engineering, benchmarking, and other collaborative design techniques
allow companies to achieve a market advantage through the introduction of products
with more sophisticated systems integration than competitors. A parallel strategy is to
focus on process enhancements.  For example, the introduction of “just-in-time”
delivery systems has allowed innovative companies to radically reduce inventory costs,
while allowing consumers more flexibility in customizing product specifications
(Schonberger, 1982; Asanuma, 1993).  Heightened quality control risks created by JIT
delivery have also created competition across companies to introduce “quality
management systems” with their suppliers.  Companies compete on the overall
effectiveness and efficiency of quality management regimes. In this case, the
innovative strategy is characterized by on-going quality dialogues designed to
continuously reduce quality control costs while simultaneously creating quality
management systems with close to zero defect rates and an ability to rapidly
incorporate changes in the production process.
Emulation-based product market strategies
Innovative companies attempt to appropriate their discoveries through patents,
tacit-knowledge, the introduction of standards, or other devices.  However, most
innovations eventually diffuse to other companies within an industry (see Teece, 1986).
Non-innovative companies attempt to keep abreast with broad industry trends through
emulating standardized forms of innovations created elsewhere, but then
supplementing or linking them with other competitive assets to achieve market success.
Both the German “diversified quality production” (DQP) approach and more
opportunistic price-based product market strategies rely on this approach to
appropriating technology.  Opportunistic strategies link standardized forms of
innovations with the delegation of market risks to non-essential workers or suppliers
while the DQP embeds them with club-goods created through the German
associational governance system.
Price-competition (opportunism).  This is a general term for all strategies that
create market advantages through the delegation of risks to weaker market
participants, whether these are internal employees or, of more relevance here,
suppliers.  Particularly when there exists a large pool of potential suppliers for each
subcontracted component, final assemblers have substantial bargaining advantages
over suppliers that may be used to develop opportunistic governance structures.  The
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control rights contained in these structures allow the final assembler to externalize
costs of industrial adjustment to suppliers.   Legal clauses do this through delegating to
the final assembler unilateral control rights over incomplete contracting contingencies.
These typically include rights to change the price of parts or quantity ordered when
market conditions change or the delegation of various liability risks to the supplier (see
Popp, 1993).
Within Germany and other countries with regulatory contract law systems, the
introduction of new supplier network concepts often creates an opportunity to
redistribute legal and market risks to suppliers under the pretense of innovation.  For
example, many German companies have created minimal versions of JIT delivery
systems in order to reduce inventory costs and improve product variety while
simultaneously delegating important legal liability risks to suppliers.  German private
law obligates final assemblers in most subcontracting relationships to conduct “entry
inspections” of all goods upon delivery.  These inspections force final assemblers to
assume important legal liability risks.  If inspections are not completed and defective
goods subsequently damage machine tools, create work delays, or escape unnoticed
into final products and eventually harm customers, the final assembler must assume
partial liability.  German final assemblers have used the introduction of minimal forms of
JIT delivery as a mechanism to improve the technical efficiency of their supplier
networks, but also transfer these legal liability risks fully to suppliers.  They argue that
the technical organization of JIT delivery, by definition, precludes the performance of
“entry inspections.”  New contracts designed by large auto assemblers replace “entry
inspections” with “exit inspections” to be performed by suppliers and contain clauses
abrogating standard German liability laws in favor of customized clauses transferring
legal liability risks normally assumed by final assemblers to suppliers (see Casper,
1997, chapter 3).   
Diversified Quality Production (DQP): This product market strategy augments
standardized forms of innovations with club goods created collectively by firms. In the
area of inter-firm relationships companies choosing DQP strategies design collectively
design industry frameworks. I assume that, at least in the short term, these club goods
are crucially dependent on the existence of national institutions facilitating business-
coordination, such as the German associational governance system.  Thus, DQP
strategies are only sustainable in business-coordinated market economies.
Furthermore, while the innovative and price competition strategies can be implemented
by individual companies, DQP requires substantial coordination across companies in
the sector. Thus, the majority of companies within any sector must choose the strategy
if industry frameworks are to be developed.
To give an illustrative example, firms in the German electronics industry have
recently developed an industry framework for JIT delivery (see Casper, 1997 ch. 3).
The agreement integrates technical provisions over quality control with legal clauses
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distributing legal liability risks across companies.  It necessitates that final assemblers
maintain a less stringent form of the “entry inspections” mandated under German
commercial law while also requiring suppliers to introduce a systematic quality
management system, certified by accredited auditors on a regular bases, that meets
the quality demands created by JIT delivery.  On the advice of the industry association,
firms usually implement the ISO 9000 quality system.  Though not as efficient as the
more customized quality systems introduced by innovators, most firms using ISO 9000
can adequately perform as JIT supplier firms.  However, because this industry
agreement has undergone a thorough judicial review under the Cartel Office and other
industry associations, the legal implications of using this agreement are clear.
Companies preserve normal liability rights that protect suppliers.  The association has
negotiated agreements with the insurance industry to maintain normal, standardized,
insurance rates for companies using the industry framework.
 Overall, firms choosing DQP product market strategies to fully take advantage
of the incentives and constraints produced by the German associational governance
system.  Firms attempt to maximize gains offered by industry frameworks and minimize
the costs of probable legal regulation.  This usually requires creating cooperative
supplier relationships that use legal entitlements set forth in German commercial codes.
In addition, when companies cooperate to create industry frameworks they often
expose private company information to competitors.  As a result, companies most
inclined to adopt this approach are those situated within sectors with a highly
differentiated domestic market structure.  Companies in industries where domestic
competition is limited, such as electronics or machine tools, have the maximum
incentive to collectively engage the associational governance system in order to create
industry frameworks.  These frameworks help companies compete abroad, where
competition over governance structures does exist.  Table 1 summarizes this
discussion of product market stategies and related supplier network practices.
Table 1: Product market strategies and supplier network practices
Product market strategy Competitive strategy Supplier network practices
Innovate Create new forms of “best
practice.”
Create new governance structure
arrangements (usually highly
collaborative supplier relationships)
“Diversified quality
production”
Emulate existing forms of
best practice, but enhance
them with club goods
generated by associational
governance system.
Rely on standardized industry
frameworks for governance structures
Price competition Emulate existing forms of
best practice but
externalize risks/costs to
suppliers and workers.
Opportunism: distribute market and
legal risks to supplier companies.
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4.2 Legal modernization in Germany
Why do German companies participate in associational governance projects, given that
courts use the resulting industry frameworks to impose regulatory contract laws?
Central to the following analysis is the ability of German courts to make a credible
commitment towards legal regulation in all cases in which they know that large
companies would prefer industry frameworks with legal regulation rather than no
industry framework with no legal regulation.  The problem for courts is that the gains
created for companies by coordinating institutions vary depending on each company’s
particular product market strategy.  While for many companies the gains from creating
industry frameworks outweigh the costs of legal regulation, for companies with other
product market strategies this is not true.  We must examine implicit bargaining
between courts and companies for each of the three product market strategies.
The implicit bargaining game played between courts and companies is
diagramed in figure 1.  I will not attempt to solve this game in any formal sense, but
only use it to illustrate the trade-offs created by different strategies of legal regulation, in
terms of the product market strategies adopted by companies. The game assumes that
legal modernization occurs through the following process:  Bargaining is between large
companies and courts.   Companies first choose one of the three product market
strategies described earlier.  They may attempt to innovate (I), to compete on the basis
of price by externalizing costs to suppliers whenever possible (P), or to compete on the
basis of engaging standardized governance structures that are produced as part of
industry frameworks (S).  When disputed contracts are adjudicated before courts, I
assume that the courts can judge the type of product market strategy chosen only if it is
the standardized governance structure choice (S).   Courts cannot differentiate between
companies choosing to compete on price (P) or on innovative governance structures
(I). Courts adopt a legal strategy (R, NR), where R denotes a strategy of regulating the
distribution of legal entitlements within a contract while NR refers to no regulation.
Companies decide whether or not to create industry frameworks (IF, NF), where IF
denotes a strategy of engaging the associational governance system to create industry
frameworks and NF refers to a strategy of not creating industry frameworks. This
produces four general framework possibilities:
IFNR -industry framework, no legal regulation
IFR - industry framework, legal regulation
NFR - no industry framework, legal regulation
NFNR - no industry framework, no legal regulation
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Framework preferences of courts and large firms
Courts have a fixed ordering of preferences, but those of large companies
depend on the product market strategy they choose to adopt.
Framework Preferences of Public Actors (Courts)
Courts play the key role in determining the regulatory structure of contract law.
Will they attempt to police the distribution of legal and market risks across companies
through strong legal regulation, or will courts pursue an “enabling” strategy concerned
with enforcing the letter of contract, no matter how it distributes risks?  A core point of
the earlier section on contract law regulation is that courts cannot always efficiently
enforce all contracting laws.   Efficiency can be defined as the ability to implement laws
effectively; courts can obtain all information about the relationship that is presupposed
within the contract law doctrine that they are enforcing.  If courts do not have the
information necessary to apply laws consistently, judicial process norms will be broken.
There are thus three possible outcomes for courts:
  - regulatory laws plus efficiency
 - efficiency alone
 - regulatory laws without efficiency
These general preferences can be translated into regulatory framework
preferences as follows. In Germany broad social norms underlying the idea of the
“social market economy” have combined with specific “fair trading” laws such as the
AGB-Gesetz to provide a clear public mandate for courts to apply regulatory contract
laws whenever possible.  Courts prefer legal regulation over no legal regulation
(R>NR). However, courts can only efficiently implement regulatory laws if companies
create industry frameworks. Industry frameworks reveal standardized information about
technical practices that is often hidden in private contracts.  If courts impose inefficient
legal regulation but companies decide not to develop industry frameworks, then the
resulting laws will be inefficient. Courts will fail in the core purspoe of dispute resolution,
as companies cannot effectively use the “shadow of the law” to privately settle disputes.
As a result, the IFR framework outcome is the best outcome for courts, while NFR must
be the least preferred outcome.  In between these two outcomes are the IFNR and
NFNR outcomes.  Courts can always implement “enabling” contract laws, in which they
merely enforce the written rules of contracts.  Thus, either the NRIF or NRNF outcomes
produce efficient legal outcomes.  As industry frameworks have diffuse public policy
benefits (lower transaction costs to industry and small firm competitivness), I will
assume that as agents of the state courts prefer NFIF over NFNF, but this is
inconsequential to the logic of implicit bargaining that occurs.  The regulatory
preferences of courts are thus RIF > NRIF > NRNF > RNF.
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Framework preferences of large companies
The legal preferences of large companies depend on the particular product
market strategy that they choose to adopt. For each of the three possible product
market strategies, there exists a different constellation of possible benefits and costs
that may be produced by national institutional frameworks.  I will first examine the
spectrum of benefits and constraints generated by these institutions, and then explain
how they generate particular regulatory preference orderings for each product market
strategy.
Benefits of industry frameworks:
1. Large firms obtain viable governance structures to organize inter-firm
relationships at a much lower cost than that of developing them privately.  The
institutional capacities of trade associations combined with horizontal linkages with
other associational bodies and public actors make the cost of creating industry
frameworks low. Trade associations use membership fees to create specialized legal
and technical competencies, in effect socializing the cost of creating new technical and
legal frameworks.  Because legal expertise and services are concentrated in trade
associations, most firms do not need to develop sophisticated legal competencies or
hire private law firms.  In addition, there are also important bargaining cost savings.
Companies using industry frameworks with their suppliers largely avoid distributional
conflict over the distribution of various legal entitlements (Knight, 1992, Goldberg,
1985).
2. Transaction cost savings are sometimes created through using horizontal
coordination links with other associational bodies to create interlocking legal codes. If
general patterns of economic organization are based around a standard set of legal
categories and obligations, this allows different commercial frameworks to easily
coexist and build upon one another.   Commercial codes regulating how lenders,
insurers and other “third-party service providers“ in an economy may organize their
businesses with firms may be structured around the assumption that standard legal
rules are followed.   The risk assessment of particular business deals and the costs of
setting up transactions is correlated with whether or not the firms involved follow
standard legal form in designing their dealings with one another.  When structured in an
inter-locking way, standardized contracts can result in considerable transaction cost
savings.  In most German manufacturing industries, customized contracts, for example,
between industrial liability insurers and manufacturing firms do not need to be
negotiated if industry agreements are used. And because industry agreements also
reveal considerable information about the technical organization of firms, in many
cases insurers also waive expensive customized risk assessments (see Migge, 1992).
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3. Industry frameworks also create important information externalities.  The
process of developing industry frameworks, even if they are not subsequently adopted
by many firms, helps develop and diffuse information about complex interlinkages
between contract laws, liability laws, and different technical interlinkages between
companies.  Trade associations have the competency to gather expertise needed to
propose different models of cooperation and examine the likely effects they will have on
different types of companies. Because trade associations have expertise in both
technical and legal areas, the often complex interlinkages between different parts of
governance structures can be gauged. This knowledge is costly for companies to
develop privately (see Eichengreen and Ghironi, 1996).
4. The competitiveness of small firms is increased.  They receive modern
governance structures in both legal and technical areas at no cost to themselves.   The
technical norms integrated in some industry frameworks are designed to help small
companies upgrade areas of company organization that affect their exposure to liability
risks.  Recent industry frameworks have included technical norms helping suppliers
create management systems to better implement quality and environmental controls in
their production processes (see Casper, 1997).   Large companies appropriate these
benefits through improved supplier performance and adaptive capacity (see generally
Herrigel and Sabel 1995; Teece and Pisano, 1994).
Constraints imposed by legal regulation:
Legal regulation primarily benefits small companies.   Laws prevent large firms
from pushing the costs of industrial adjustment to changes in international competition
onto small firms.  By forcing large companies to take the “high road” of adapting to
international competition through increasing the productivity and value-added created
within supplier networks, these laws might also enhance the overall competitiveness of
industry in the country.  Large firms often oppose regulation, since it is their flexibility
that it impinged upon.  There are four particular constraints on large firms created by
legal regulation:
1.  Large firms have reduced flexibility in distributing legal entitlements with
suppliers.  For example, during the 1980s German courts created legal regulation
preventing large firms from using contracts with incomplete price clauses.  Final
assemblers faced limitations on the content of legal clauses allowing price clauses to
be adjusted if market demand changes or the price of input goods fluctuate.   They
might have to include price indices or other information detailing to suppliers the
circumstances, processes, and range by which prices can change due to changed
market conditions (see Casper, 1997, chapter 5).
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2. Inefficient laws could emerge if courts impose regulation, but firms create no
industry framework.  Because all industry frameworks emerge out of a consensual
decision-making process, if large firms within an industry are strongly divided over their
content, no industry framework will be created.  Companies may also fail to develop an
industry framework because of difficulties in creating standardized solutions in
technically complex areas.  Companies have to bear the cost of inefficient laws or, if
they are extreme, circumvent public law through creating private governance
structures.
3. Courts often impose legal regulation through impinging upon the technical
organization of inter-firm relationships.  For example, in order to minimize the liability
risks small firms must accept, German law forces final assemblers to conduct “entry
inspections” of all goods purchased as soon as they are delivered by the supplier to the
final assembler.  These inspections limit the liability risks suppliers must accept, but in
doing so create technical rigidities firms face when designing new forms of industrial
organization.
4. Legal regulation limits the type of legal categories available to firms.  German
law places limits on the legal categories private actors may use to structure their
relationships. It channels all private relationships into one of two broad legal categories:
association or exchange.  By restricting the use of other basic legal categories the
complexity of legal regulation is reduced.  This limits the ability of companies to
customize incentive structures through creating novel legal categories.  For example, in
Germany the lack of legal categories recognizing network forms of organization limits
the ability of companies to pool some types of legal risks.
Based on these benefits and constraints, we can examine the regulatory
framework preferences for companies, momentarily assuming they have already
chosen one of the three available product market strategies.
1. Diversified Quality Production.  For companies using DQP product market
strategies the benefits gained from industry frameworks outweighs the costs of legal
regulation.  The preferred outcome is no legal regulation with industry framework
(NRIF).  Since the cost of legal regulation is small, the regulation with industry
framework outcome (RIF) is preferred over the no regulation and no industry framework
outcome (NRNF).  Regulation with no industry framework (RNF) is the least favored
outcome, since here legal regulation will be both costly and inefficient, creating
additional governance costs in addition to the lack of associational governance
benefits. The resulting regulatory preference ordering of companies with this product
market strategy is NRIF > RIF > NRNF > RNF.
2. Price-competition.  For companies concerned with the ability to retain control
rights over legal and market risks, the threat of legal regulation strongly influences the
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decision to participate in industry framework projects.  Companies choosing cost based
product market strategies are usually not innovative in creating their own supplier
network structures, and thus could appropriate most of the benefits created by industry
structures.  Such firms often participate in technical standardization projects and also
benefit from the creation of interlocking legal frameworks.  However, they are likely to
oppose any industry framework that include legal provisions that fall under existing
areas of regulatory contract law or are likely to provoke new regulation from courts.
Even with the ability to opt out of industry frameworks (which is protected under
German law), the legalization and use by other companies of legally unfavorable
clauses in industry frameworks decreases the ability of large companies to impose
illegal contractual structures on weaker partners.   Case law and public information
concerning the governance structures regulated in industry frameworks will better
inform supplier companies about their legal rights in complex areas of the law.  While
raw bargaining power might allow large companies to include illegal or quasi-legal
contract clauses in some domains, in other areas supplier companies will know what
their rights are and can insist on maintaining normal practice.
For companies choosing to compete on costs, the NR > R legal preference
strongly outweighs the IF > NF associational governance preference.  While the NRIF
outcome is most preferred, the second most favored outcome is the neutral NRNF
framework, which also preserves freedom to delegate contractual control rights.  If legal
regulation is nevertheless imposed, then these firms still prefer legal regulation with
industry frameworks (RIF) over legal regulation without industry frameworks (RNF).
The resulting regulatory framework preference ordering is NRIF > NRNF > RIF > RNF.
3. Innovation.   For innovators legal regulation is often costly. Innovative
governance structures usually formulate customized contractual structures to create
frameworks of incentives needed to sustain volatile and risky new forms of
collaboration.  Fair trading laws themselves are usually not the problem, since
innovative companies usually design cooperative relationships with suppliers and often
adopt strategies of sharing most legal risks in order to align incentives.  However, limits
on legal categories or attempts by courts to standardize some technical aspects of the
division of labor between firms are often very costly.  If courts will not recognize the
legal categories or underlying division of technical labor between highly innovative large
firms and its suppliers, these companies must then opt out of the normal system of
legal entitlements and remedies governing inter-firm relationships and create private
contracting rules to manage relationships.  Innovators thus have a strong preference for
an “enabling” system of contract law (NR > R)
Innovators also have little to gain from the associational governance system.
Innovators do benefit from the improved competitiveness of smaller supplier firms.
However, the primary goal of industry frameworks is to create tool-kits showing other
large firms how to emulate new forms of industrial organization.  Why should an
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innovative company directly help other large firms appropriate its inventions?
Innovators thus have a preference for no industry frameworks (NF > IF).
Overall, innovators have a strong first preference for NFNR and their least
desired framework preference is RIF.  The second and third preferences could be
argued either way.  However, for most innovators the legal preference should outweigh
the associational governance preferences (NRIF > RNF).  Innovators are dependent on
an enabling system of contract law to create customized governance structures.  While
appropriability is a core concern to all innovative companies, industry frameworks will
only be used by companies operating in Germany, and therefore do not influence the
innovator’s position against competitors in other countries.  The framework preference
ordering for innovators is thus: NRNF > NRIF > RNF > RIF
 Table 2 summarizes the framework preferences for German courts and large
firms:
Table 2: Framework preferences for German courts and large firms
Actor Framework Preferences
Courts RIF > NRIF > NRNF > RNF
Large firms by Product Market Strategy:
DQP NRIF > RIF > NRNF > RNF
Price-based (opportunism) NRIF > NRNF > RIF > RNF
Innovation NRNF > NRIF > RNF > RIF
Bargaining outcomes in Germany
We can now examine implicit bargaining between courts and large firms.  I will
start by examining the legal strategies courts would develop for companies competing
in each product market strategy, if they had perfect information as to the type of
company they were dealing with.  From this analysis, we can then examine whether
dominant strategies emerge for courts in situations where they do not always know the
product market strategy type of the large company.
Court strategies with perfect information as to the type of product market strategy
  
Court regulatory strategies for competing on the basis of industry frameworks
(S): DQP firms have a dominant strategy to always choose to create industry
frameworks.  Thus, courts can always credibly commit to legal regulation, knowing that
companies will choose to create industry frameworks and that the resulting legal
regulation will be efficient.  This regulatory outcome (S,R,IF) produces the second most
favored outcome for companies, and the first preference for courts.
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Court regulatory strategies for companies attempting to compete on the basis of
cost (P): Here implicit bargaining becomes more complex.  Because price competitors
value no legal regulation much more than the gains from industry frameworks,
companies have an incentive to commit to a no framework policy, since they must
assume that courts will always regulate any industry frameworks created.  Even though
legal regulation could then lead to their least preferred outcome (P,R,NF), companies
know that this is an inefficient outcome for courts as well.  If courts believed this threat,
they might not adopt legal regulation, creating the second most favored outcome for
companies (P,NR,NF), which must be seen as far superior than any outcome that
includes legal regulation.
Nevertheless, if courts are certain that the company is competing on price, they
might still choose a strategy of legal regulation.   From a German public policy
perspective, courts have a strong mandate to punish companies adopting the price
competition strategy.   This might be interpreted to mean that the cost to courts of
arriving at the (P,R,NF) outcome is not as high as in the other cases, since inefficient
legal decisions in effect adds to the “punishment” imposed upon companies adopting
industrial practices socially defined as illegitimate.  But besides this point, if courts
consistently adopt a policy of legal regulation across all cases, companies must realize
that their threat not to create industry frameworks is not credible.  Faced with legal
regulation in any case, companies will then create industry frameworks, since then they
receive their third most preferred outcome (P,R,IF) instead of their least preferred
outcome (P,R,NF).  Of course, once firms adopt this strategy, courts achieve their
preferred regulatory outcome.
Court legal regulation strategies for innovative firms (I):  Innovators face a similar
dilemma as price competitors. Even though innovative companies prefer NRIF to RNF,
they have a strong rationale to always choose NF.  Doing so ensures that the least
favored RIF outcome is avoided, and creates a possibility that courts, fearing the
creation of inefficient law, will help innovators achieve their most favored outcome
through choosing NR.  The difference between this and the price competitor case,
however, is that there exists no social legitimacy for a punishment strategy against
innovators.  While courts are encouraged to punish price competitors through various
fair trading laws, why should courts attempt to punish known innovators? So long as
courts know they are dealing with innovators, they should understand that enabling
laws are needed to facilitate the creation of customized contractual structures needed
to support new forms of organization, not to opportunistically redistribute risks to
weaker suppliers. In other words, the payoff courts receive for the most favored (I,R,IF)
framework must be lower than that for (P,R,IF).  Similarly, since fair trading laws
empower courts to punish opportunists but not innovators, the court payoff for the least
preferred outcome in the innovation case (I, R,NF) must be much lower than that for the
(P,R,NF).  Thus, if courts want to create national institutional frameworks hospitable to
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innovation, they must chose NR. Doing so preserves a large role for law in promoting
innovation, and avoids the possibility that courts will obtain their least preferred RNF
framework outcome.
Court strategies when they do not know the type of product market strategy chosen
If courts could discriminate between different product market strategies when
receiving cases, then the problem of legal regulation would be simple.  Courts could
customize legal regulation to promote innovative firms and those competing with
industry frameworks, while punishing cost competitors through strong legal sanctions.
This, however, is seldom possible.  As a practical matter, courts develop laws for the
economy as a whole and can rarely customize precedent to suit the needs of particular
sectors or product market strategies.  If courts could tailor the law to suit particular
product market strategy types, they would still face important information asymmetries.
It is difficult for courts to distinguish between innovative contractual structures and the
contractual structures used by companies attempting to compete on price.
To illustrate this problem, consider again the importation of a new form of
industrial organization from abroad, such as JIT delivery.  Some companies in
Germany have decided not simply to emulate standard forms of JIT delivery and
related quality control systems, but to compete with Japanese and US firms directly on
the basis of creating new legal and technical innovations in managing quality control
and logistical relationships with suppliers.  These are the innovators.  Other companies
merely want to emulate standard forms of “best practice” developed by international
competitors into their operations.  However, new logistical and quality control concepts
necessitate the reorganization of important legal liability entitlements.   This
modernization of legal clauses often may occur in a variety of ways.  Companies may
attempt to preserve the content, if not form, of existing legal entitlements as they have
been developed through German legislation or case law, while introducing standard
forms of the new industrial arrangements into their operations.  Companies choosing
this strategy have every incentive to develop an industry framework, as this minimizes
the costs of obtaining viable new governance structures.  Other companies might
choose to create contractual frameworks that support minimal forms of the new
industrial organization, but at the same time redistribute legal and market risks between
final assemblers and suppliers in favor of the final assembler.  In the JIT case, many
German final assemblers have used this opportunity to redistribute important liability
risks away from final assemblers and to suppliers.  This is in essence the price
competition strategy.
In this example, firms choosing innovative and opportunistic strategies will alter
standard contractual clauses: in one case because they have to be in order to support
the innovative form of industrial organization and in the other because doing so
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opportunistically benefits the large firm.  Companies competing on price have every
incentive to claim both to courts and their contractual partners that changes in standard
practice are being adopted to facilitate “best practice”.  Not understanding the
underlying technical practices until industry frameworks have been developed, courts
only see incomplete contracting structures and altered versions of standard contractual
clauses, both of which in many cases clearly violate the AGB-Gesetz and other
regulatory contract laws.  The assumption that courts cannot discriminate between
product market strategies is usually warranted.
Let’s now assume that a large company has not yet chosen a product market
strategy.  From the court’s point of view, legal regulation has the positive effect of
raising the cost of opportunism, in effect creating incentives for companies
contemplating the S or P strategies to choose the DQP strategy. However, this threat is
only viable when large firms know that choosing P will always lead to a punishment
outcome.  A court strategy of rewarding innovators through choosing NR all or most of
the time would lead many non-innovating firms to choose P over S.  It creates an
incentive for price competitors to disguise themselves as innovators.  In game theory
terminology, this is a “signaling strategy” designed to achieve a “pooling equilibrium”
(Gibbons, 1992, chapter 4).  They can do this by choosing P and then NF.  The
(P,NR,NF) outcome is likely to outweigh the (S,R,IF) outcome for many firms.  This is
particularly true for companies experiencing substantial competition from low-cost
foreign producers.  The problem, however, is that a fixed strategy of legal regulation
punishes innovation companies as well as companies attempting to compete on the
basis of costs.  This is the basic dilemma of legal regulation in Germany.
By eliminating the possibility of a strongly preferred outcome within the P
strategy, courts may interpret legal regulation as promoting the associational
governance system through giving companies an incentive to choose S and create
industry frameworks.  Companies competing on the basis of DQP strategies know that
they are very likely to encounter legal regulation.  However, because they organize the
supplier network to maximize gains from industry framework and minimize the potential
costs of legal regulation, they can obtain a better regulatory framework outcome, in
terms of preference orderings, than companies competing on costs.   They also have
an incentive to minimize the potential costs of courts regulating their governance
structures.  They can do this through creating cooperative, long-term relationships with
suppliers.  From both a court perspective and a broader public policy viewpoint, this is
clearly a superior outcome.
Potential innovators, however, must also cope with legal regulation designed to
sway potential price competitors to adopt the DQP strategy.  Whenever the RIF
equilibrium prevails, national institutional frameworks become a constraint on
innovation.  Innovators must circumvent legal regulation by create private governance
structures to support new forms of organization.  Furthermore, most other firms in the
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sector will chose to compete on the DQP strategy, meaning they will be emulators
much more than potential partners interested in cooperating to create new innovations.
Given this decision calculus, it should not be surprising if potential innovators decide to
choose the DQP strategy too.
Courts also have private incentives to create a general pooling equilibrium
around S.  Because companies choosing S will always create industry frameworks,
only this outcome assures that courts will always be in a position to efficiently regulate
contracts. Remember that industry frameworks can only be created when there is a
consensus among large firms within particular industry associations.  For different
reasons, both innovators and price competitors are opposed to legal regulation, and
thus have an incentive to undermine associational governance projects.  Since, for
cartel law reasons, the associational governance system is organized on consensus
principles, a small coalition of large firms can easily thwart any industry framework
project.  As long as there is no way for courts to prevent price competitors from
attempting to pool with innovators, courts have a strong incentive to develop a signaling
strategy of always adopting legal regulation, since this promotes a pooling equilibrium
around diversified quality production (S).   The broad public policy problem is that the
cost of this strategy – punishing innovative companies – is borne by the public and not
courts.
4.3 Legal modernization in the United States
Because the institutional infrastructure in the United States lacks coordinating
institutions, large companies cannot cheaply collaborate to create industry frameworks.
This eliminates DQP as a viable product market strategy, at least in terms of creating
supporting institutional frameworks.  This simplifies the possible regulatory frameworks
available to firms and also creates dominant strategies for both courts and large firms,
in effect eliminating the complex strategic bargaining made possible within Germany’s
coordinated political economy.
Regulatory Preferences
In the absence of a possibility for companies to use business coordination
institutions to create industry frameworks, there are only two possible regulatory
outcomes:
NR - no legal regulation
R - legal regulation
Large companies: For all large companies, the preferred outcome is NR>R.  The
reasoning is identical to that in Germany.  Companies choosing the innovative product
market strategy need “enabling” laws that allow them to customize legal categories in
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order to create sophisticated new legal frameworks to support new forms of
cooperation.  Companies preferring to compete on the basis of price oppose legal
regulation that prohibits the creation of contractual structures that delegate market and
legal risks to suppliers.
Courts:  The general preferences of US courts are similar to German courts.  In
areas where information asymmetries do not exist, such as product liability, US courts
have not hesitated to implement highly regulatory legal doctrines when public policy
and legal philosophy shifted in support of these laws.  We have already seen that US
courts have refused to implement regulatory contract laws in cases in which they lack
private information about industrial practices.  The reason again is that these laws
would violate judicial process norms, undermining the consistency of legal reasoning
within the precedent system.  We may assume that US courts have a preference
ordering of NR>R when dealing with innovative companies.  When dealing with
companies competing on the basis of price, courts probably would prefer effective
regulatory laws, but since industry coordination is not possible in the United States, this
outcome is eliminated, so courts must again prefer NR>R.
Table 3: Framework preferences for courts and Large firms in the United States
Actor Framework preference
Courts NR>R
Large Firms NR>R
Bargaining Outcome
Figure 2 diagrams the legal regulation game for the United States.  Implicit
bargaining between courts and large companies is simple, since companies can always
credibly commit to their preferred product market strategy. Courts might prefer the
stricter regulation of contracts.  However, they lack the ability to implement regulatory
contracting doctrines in all areas where the governance structures used by firms are
complex and embedded with information not available to courts.  Furthermore, the
institutions facilitating the creation of industry frameworks lie outside the legal system
and, due to a combination of both America’s historical development and the current
strategies of companies, do not exist.  Legal actors thus lack the necessarily policy
instruments to promote their favored strategies.  Thus they will chose to maximize
efficiency.  This can be promoted through “enabling” laws that promote flexibility by
companies in creating a wide variety of governance structures and then enforcing the
formal rules companies chose to create.  The resulting regulatory climate for inter-firm
relations fully supports both the innovative and price-based product market strategies.
To summarize, US legal regulation can influence the external risk structure faced
by firms, but cannot mandate how firms distribute the new risks among themselves.
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Important changes in legal risks may occur through legislation or broad changes in
legal philosophy, so long as these new laws do not require the adjudication of
incomplete contracting structures.
5. Conclusion
The chapter has examined why differences in institutional structures in the US and
Germany lead to different capacities for public regulation of inter-firm relationships, and
the influence this regulation has on the product market strategies of firms.  Due to
differences in historical development, German companies are embedded within
complex networks of coordinated institutions that they may engage to create industry
frameworks.  However, we also saw that courts can use these frameworks to
successfully implement regulatory legal doctrines.  The chapter then examined the
process of legal modernization, showing how legal actors and companies are likely to
bargain over the creation of new laws in the two countries.  From this analysis stylized
descriptions of different trajectories of legal modernization in the US and Germany were
created.  The chapter concludes by considering the stability of these two trajectories of
legal development.
In the United States courts and firms have dominant strategies that depend on
no implicit bargaining.  Lacking fundamental institutional change, the US seems locked
in a very stable regulatory outcome.  An industrial dualism exists in the United States.
National institutional frameworks do not support DQP product market strategies, but
allow companies to pursue radical innovation in law or adopt predatory practices
designed to compete through delegating the costs of industrial adjustment to others.
Most large American companies are not interested in copying German style
industrial arrangements.   This is because most large American companies obtain their
preferred outcome under the present institutional arrangements: few regulations on
their freedom to contract.  This is particularly true for companies relying on innovative
product market structures that depend on sophisticated relationships with other
companies.  In terms of the product market strategies supported, this freedom is much
more than the ability to adopt product market strategies based on delegating risks to
weaker partners.  The US institutional infrastructure has pushed American companies
towards fundamentally different product market strategies than in Germany.  US
contract law, as one aspect of a broader body of corporate law that is broadly
“enabling” in character (see Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991), allows American firms to
compete over the organization and thus effectiveness of governance structures.
Particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, the flexibility that American companies have
shown in creating highly innovative forms of industrial organization is a key factor
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allowing American companies to create product market innovations.  The vast
decentralization of legal resources in the United States is direct result of the companies
demanding the ability to create complex governance structures.
Because legal resources are decentralized, it is very hard to imagine the
underlying logic of American corporate legal development changing.  Legal innovation
is driven by thousands of private decisions by companies and courts.   Individual
companies create new contracting structures which, if successful, other companies
might mimic.  No collective action is necessary, and innovation usually occurs through
competition.  Furthermore, once companies embark on the product market strategies
encouraged by these institutional arrangements, they develop private legal
competencies and other resources allowing them to adopt product market strategies
designed around competing on the basis of governance structures.  These sunk costs
create an additional source of stability.  Even if changes to the US institutional
infrastructure radically lowered the costs of creating industry frameworks, many large
US firms are unlikely to engage these institutions to create industry frameworks.  This is
because most large firms already have the competencies needed to create and
compete on the basis of complex private governance structures.  Unless the gains from
coordination are high enough to motivate companies to adopt new product market
strategies and different internal resources to support them, large US firms would be
unlikely to engage coordinating institutions.
By contrast, the German system of legal development is volatile. The creation of
industry frameworks requires collective action by large companies. Institutions
supporting business coordination lower the cost of cooperating to develop industry
frameworks. The possibility of strong legal regulation will continue to create incentives
for companies choose DQP strategies, while the associational governance system will
allow DQP firms to continue to create important club that are not available to
international competitors.  While these factors lend stability to the system, they will also
continue to produce framework continues inhospitable to innovators.
However, as the bargaining analysis made clear, even “typical” German DQP
companies do not get their preferred outcome: the development of industry frameworks
without strong legal regulation. As international product market competition continues to
increase, firms may feel compelled to develop product market strategies that are not
advantaged by German national institutional frameworks.  German companies may
increasingly be willing to pay the governance costs of opting out of German institutional
frameworks in order to choose innovative or price competition strategies. Even if
cooperation is cheap and rewarding, if enough important companies are not interested
for other reasons, the German associational governance system could weaken.
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Figure 1: Legal regulation Game in Germany
                                                    Firm (F)
                            S                     P                                   I
     Court (C)                                 C                                              C
                              NR                            NR                          R          NR
                                  F                                F                                         F
                       IF           NF                IF         NF                         IF           NF
               (S,NR,IF)   (S,NR,NF)  (P,NR,IF)    (P,NR,NF)            (I,NR,IF)       (I,NR,NF)
         R                               R                                          R
             F                                F                                             F
 IF              NF           IF              NF                       IF               NF
(S,R,IF)      (S,R,NF)    (P,R,IF)         (P,R,NF)        (I,R,IF)                 (I,R,NF)
Firm choices:
S: Adopt product market strategy using industry frameworks as governance
structures
P: Adopt a product market strategy based on shifting legal and market risks to
suppliers
I: Adopt a product market strategy based on creating innovative inter-firm
governance structures
IF = Create industry framework
NF = do not create industry framework
Court choices:
R = create regulatory contract laws
NR = create no regulatory contract laws
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Figure 2: Legal regulation game in the United States
          Firm (F)
                                                 P                          I
                      Court (C)                                              (C)
                                   R            NR                      R        NR
                               (P,R)                (P,NR)          (I,R)             (I,NR)
Firm choices:
P: Adopt a product market strategy using industry frameworks as governance
structures.
I: Adopt a product market strategy based on shifting legal and market risks to
suppliers.
Court Choices:
R: Create regulatory contract laws
NR: Create no regulatory contract laws.
